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This paper studies transitions out of unemployment in Spain distinguishing between 
recall to the same employer and reemployment in a new job. We use a large sample of 
newly unemployed workers obtained from Social Security records for Spain. These data 
contain  information  about  each  individual’s  employer  identity  before  and  after  the 
unemployment  spell.  A  discrete-time  duration  model  with  competing  risks  of  exits 
serves  us  to  investigate  the  factors  that  influence  the  probabilities  of  leaving 
unemployment to return to the same employer or to find a new job with a different 
employer. We find that the route to exit unemployment is determinant to understand the 
influence of individual and job characteristics on the hazard rate, as well as the latter 
dependence on unemployment duration. The recall hazard rate exhibits positive duration 
dependence during the first months and negative duration dependence thereafter (it is 
larger for females), while the new-job hazard presents positive duration dependence (it 
is larger for males). 
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Workers who lose their jobs can become re-employed either by being recalled to their 
previous employers of by finding new jobs. Temporary layoff unemployment can be 
defined  as  unemployment  in  spells  that  ended  with  the  unemployed  person  being 
rehired by the same employer. This issue has been studied from a two-fold theoretical 
perspective. On the one hand, following the implicit contract theory (Feldstein, 1976, 
1978; Baily, 1977), firm's incentives play a key role in the timing of recalls, since they 
tend  to  layoff  workers  on  temporary  bases  due  to  a  decline  in  product  demand. 
Temporary layoffs result from product demand fluctuations and reflect high attachment 
between workers and firms
1. On the other hand, temporary layoff search theory stresses 
the  supply  of  labour  —in  contrast  with  the  implicit  contract  theory  that  assumes 
temporary  layoff  durations  to  be  exogenous  to  worker  behaviour  (determined  by 
product demand). In this venue, search effort is predicted to be smaller for workers on 
temporary layoffs than for completely unattached workers, so the reservation wage of 
an attached worker on temporary layoff is larger than that of an equally qualified but 
unattached worker (Mortensen, 1990). Moreover, worker’s productivity decreases with 
unemployment duration and search strategies are revised towards less recall waiting and 
more search for a new job as unemployment lengthens. This behaviour justifies the 
finding of significant differences between the effects of the explanatory variables on the 
recall hazard rate and the new job hazard rate (Katz, 1986; Jensen and Westergärd-
Nielsen,  1990;  Corak,  1996;  Jensen  and  Nielsen,  1999;  Røed  and  Nordberg,  2003; 
Rosholm and Svarer, 2001). 
 
National data (mainly administrative) suggest that one-third of unemployed workers are 
on  temporary  layoff  in  the  United  States  and  Canada  (OECD,  2002,  pp.  218).  As 
regards Europe,
2 temporary layoff unemployment has been recognised as an integral 
part of the Danish (Jensen and Westergärd-Nielsen, 1990), the Austrian (Winter-Ebmer, 
1998), the German (Mavromaras and Orme, 2004), and the Norwegian labour markets 
(Røed and Nordberg, 2003). 
 
The goal of this paper is to document that recall outcomes are relevant for an important 
part  of  the  unemployed  in  Spain  and  to  study  the  determinants  of  exits  from 
unemployment through recall and a new job as distinct alternatives. This will allow us 
to  characterise  possible  differences  and  to  provide  new  insights  into  the  causal 
mechanism that determines the transitions from unemployment to employment through 
recall or a different employer. This issue has so far never been studied in Spain, in part 
due to lack of adequate data. We use data from Social Security records that contain 
information on all employment (and unemployment) spells of workers in the Spanish 
labour market over a three-year period (from June 1999 to June 2002). We focus in 
particular in the unemployment spells caused by involuntary reasons. Job transitions 
due to quits are not considered in our analysis, given that they are worker-initiated 
rather than firm-initiated separations. 
                                                 
1 There are many other conditions that provide incentives for firms to layoff workers temporarily: 1) an 
imperfectly experience-rated unemployment insurance system; 2) workers’ possession of specific human 
capital and its high cost of acquisition; 3) the difficulties and cost associated with recruitment in the open 
market; 4) uncertainties about the quality of the job match that will be achieved with newly recruited 
employees, etc. 
2 Some observers have suggested that tighter regulatory impediments to the recruitment and dismissal of 
employees  are  responsible  for  the  lower  incidence  of  temporary  layoff  in  Europe  (e.g.,  Moy  and 
Sorrentino, 1981; Gutierrez-Rieger and Podzeczeck, 1981; for legal restraints on layoff in general, see 
Emerson, 1988). For instance, as Layard et al. (1991), remark, “… in other countries, the system of 
temporary layoffs barely exists and almost none of the unemployed return to the same firm.” (pp. 114).   3
 
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section two describes the data and the 
sample. In section 3, we specify a discrete hazard model under competing risks for 
modelling  the  transitions  from  unemployment  to  employment  through  recall  or  a 
different employer. Section 4 provides the results. Finally, some concluding remarks 
follow in section five. This paper contains several contributions to the literature. First, 
we obtain that more than a third of unemployed who find a job return to the previous 
employer. Second, we present new evidence showing that recall and new job outcomes 
are governed by completely different individual and job characteristics. Third, the recall 
hazard rates show positive duration dependence during the first months and negative 
duration dependence thereafter (larger for females), while the longer the unemployment 
duration, the higher the probability of entering into a new job is (larger for males).  
 
2. The data and sample 
 
This  paper  uses  data  from  Social  Security  records  that  contain  information  on  all 
employment (and non-employment) spells of workers in the Spanish labour market over 
a three-year period (from June 1999 to June 2002). The data set includes information on 
age, gender, qualification level
3, dates of start and end of employment spells, reason for 
termination of the spell (voluntary/involuntary or retirement), province of residence of 
the worker, an identifier of whether each employment spell is accomplished through a 
temporary  help  agency  (THA)  or  not,  the  type  of  contract  held  by  the  worker 
(temporary or permanent), and firm size. These data set was matched with HSIPRE 
(Histórico del Sistema Integrado de Prestaciones), another administrative data set, that 
provides information
4 on the last ten spells of unemployment benefits received by each 
worker. Thus, we know whether each individual was receiving unemployment benefits 
when out of work, the type of benefits received (of contributory or assistance type), the 
number of days granted for benefit and the number of days of benefit receipt. 
 
The advantage of using Social Security records for the analysis of flows in and out of 
unemployment is threefold: (i) The availability of information on all jobs held by the 
individual during a certain interval of time; (ii) unemployment duration is very accurate 
and detailed; (iii) it is possible to distinguish spells ending through recall from those 
ending through the finding of a new job. In addition, the combination with data from the 
unemployment benefits receipt allows us to overcome many of the limitations of studies 
that use data from either Social Security records or the HSIPRE.
5 An advantage of the 
data use is that information is available on the entire spell of non-employment, and a 
limitation is that it contains the complete work history of individuals over a rather short 
period (from June 1999 to June 2002). 
 
                                                 
3 The qualification level indicates a position in a ranking determined by the worker's contribution to the 
Social Security system. It is somewhat related to the individual's qualification level, since it reflects the 
worker's professional category and salary. It could happen, however, that a worker with higher education 
is far below the category that would correspond to his formal education (see appendix Table A.1).  
4 Therefore, our data is composed of two different random samples for the Spanish labour market: (i) 
2.5% of individuals who were either employed or receiving unemployment insurance benefits in June of 
2002; (ii) 2.5% of individuals who were registered at the employment office in June of 2002 without 
receiving any unemployment benefits. This second sample was extracted in order not to exclude from our 
analysis the individuals who did not appear at the time of selecting the sample (June of 2002) from Social 
Security records. 
5 A different extraction from Social Security records was previously used to study employment and 
unemployment  spells  through  the  use  of  duration  models  in  García-Fontes  and  Hopenhayn  (1996), 
García-Pérez (1997), and García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón (2005a, 2005b), but they only have data up to 
the year 1999. On the other hand, Cebrián et al. (1996), Arranz and Muro(2004) and Jenkins and García-
Serrano (2004) have used HSIPRE.   4
Since  each  firm  in  the  database  is  issued  an  (anonymous)  identification  number  —
which  is  separately  recorded  for  every  single  spell  of  employment—  temporary 
separations are identified by whether or not each firm’s identification numbers of two 
subsequent employment spells are equal. It is noteworthy to underlie that we only refer 
to temporary layoffs in an ex post sense —i.e., job separations ending in recall. We have 
no  information  on  ex  ante  temporary  layoffs  —i.e.,  those  that  begin  with  a  person 
expecting to be recalled. Thus, the ex post measure is likely to underestimate the total 
amount of unemployment affected by recall prospects, since it does not include the 
unemployment of those who initially waited for recall but were not recalled. In any 
case, this ex post concept gives the proportion of unemployment from spells involving 
no job change (Feldstein, 1975; Clark and Summers, 1979), and it is not ambiguous in 




The data contains an initial sample of 79,267 representative cases drawn from workers 
who were subject to Social Security contributions and become jobless at some point in 
time during the first semester of 2000. We drop individuals who do not meet all the 
following  criteria:  1)  Entered  unemployment  due  to  involuntary  reasons  —i.e., 
dismissals or termination of temporary contracts
7. As we consider only the first spell of 
unemployment  occurring  in  the  indicated  period,  we  obtain  a  “flow  sample”  of 
unemployed workers in the terminology of Lancaster (1990), pp. 162; 2) In the previous 
job, the individual was registered with the General System of Social Security
8; 3) We 
have  complete  information  on  all  the  variables  used  in  the  empirical  analysis;  4) 
Workers must remain out of work for more than 30 days. We eliminate workers with 
unemployment  spells  lasting  30  days  or  less  because  they  experiment  straight 
movements from job to job without experiencing unemployment. Finally, we limit our 




After  applying  the  indicated  sample  selections,  we  obtain  a  final  sample  of  23,035 
individuals. Table A.2 of the appendix shows the loss of observations from the initial 
dataset. In the sample, each of those individuals has been followed from the time when 
they  become  unemployed  in  the  first  semester  of  the  year  2000  until  their  re-
employment occurs. Those still without a job in June 2002 have been treated as right-
censored observations
9. Main variable definitions and basic descriptive statistics for the 
sample used in the empirical analysis are given in Table 1. 
 
                                                 
6 The wide use of temporary employment in the Spanish labour market advises us against the use of the 
term  “temporary  layoff”  in  connection  with  recall  activity  by  firms.  For  this  reason,  we  analyse 
unemployment duration paying more attention on how the unemployment spell ends than on how it was 
initiated. More specifically, a great majority of workers in Spain become unemployed because of end of 
their contracts. We understand that end of contract is not exactly the same thing as layoff. By contracting 
with fixed-term contracts, firms have no need for temporary layoffs. Workers with permanent contracts 
are expensive to dismiss, so when they are laid-off they are unlikely to come back or to be called back. 
Because of these considerations, when we use the term layoff it has to be understood that separations 
because of expiration of contracts are also included. 
7 We cannot distinguish between these two reasons for job termination. Workers who quit their jobs (end 
their employment for voluntary reasons) are not considered in this study because we do not know why 
this happens and these workers are likely to leave the labour force (see García-Pérez and Muñoz-Bullón, 
2005b). 
8 Because specific regimes like Farming and Self-employment have different rules for accessing benefits 
and the peculiarities of their employment relationships, they should be object of separate analysis. 
9 We have created an artificial right censoring for observations of workers whose unemployment spell 
duration extend beyond 19 months because there is a small number of workers for whom re-employment 
does not occur.   5
As it is shown in this table, thirty-six percent of unemployed who find a job return to an 
employer  where  they  were  previously  employed  (8,277  over  23,035  individuals). 
Therefore,  recalls  do  constitute,  indeed,  an  important  element  of  unemployment  in 
Spain. This figure is even higher than the one found in other European countries
10. We 
also see that recall is more concentrated on certain individuals. In particular, males are 
less likely to return to their previous employer when exiting from unemployment (66 
percent of recalled individuals are women as opposed to 44 percent among non-recalled 
individuals). Moreover, age appears as another relevant determinant of being recalled: 
the recall outcome is slightly more important for individuals under 35 years old. And 
individuals in possession of either low or low-intermediate qualification levels tend to 
experiment a relatively higher recall outcome. Moreover, on average, recalls seem to be 
more concentrated on workers with shorter unemployment spells, shorter employment 
duration and slightly higher number of previous jobs
11. 
 
According to the results from a multivariate logit model
12 (not shown) the probability 
that a given unemployed becomes recalled to his or her previous employer, rather than 
becoming  in  a  new  job,  is  more  likely  to  be  associated  with  the  following 
characteristics: women, older than 39 — a fact which is consistent with the view of 
firms trying to maintain their eldest employees’ specific human capital — either high or 
low skilled — although this effect of qualification only remains for men—, held a non 
permanent contract
13, worked in a relatively short period of time in firms with more 
than 200 employees, spent less time unemployed, received unemployment benefits of 
shorter duration and experienced more job changes. 
 
 
3. Econometric approach: A competing risks duration analysis 
 
For the empirical analysis, we specify a discrete time competing risks duration model 
following the formulations proposed by Allison (1982), Jenkins (1995), Lauer (2003) 
and D’Addio and Rosholm (2005) This type of models is common in the analysis of 
temporary layoffs where all the unemployed are subject to the competing risks of a 
recall and a new job (Katz, 1986; Røed and Nordberg, 2003, among others)
14. 
                                                 
10 For instance, recent evidence indicates that temporary layoffs have been common in Sweden: about 45 
% of all transitions from unemployment were recalls to the previous employer (Jansson, 2002) and of 
minor importance in the German labour market (Mavroramas and Orme, 2004) with 26%.  
11 In addition, cross tabulations of various individual characteristics with these data —not shown, but 
available from the authors upon request— clearly show that exit from unemployment through recall is 
particularly high for low skilled women (48.2 %) and for women 55 and older (70.8 %). Unemployment 
duration is negatively related to recall intensity: 21.5% of women unemployed for more than a year as 
compared with 48.3% of women unemployed for less than 20 weeks are recalled. Finally, recall tends to 
be more common among individuals in the tails of the qualification distribution. 
12  We  performed  a  logit  regression  for  the  entire  sample  and  by  gender  with  several  personal 
characteristics as independent variables. The dependent variable included people who found a job, and it 
was dichotomised as 1 if recalled and 0 if new employer. The personal characteristics used as independent 
variables were gender, age, qualification level, the type of contract in the previous job, the number of 
employees in the previous employer, tenure in the previous job, unemployment duration, whether or not 
the previous employer was a temporary help agency, whether or not the individual holds benefits (either 
contributory or assistance ones), the number of previous jobs, and, finally, the regional unemployment 
rate. 
13 The impact of the type of contract held in the previous job must be underlined: individuals who have 
held in the previous job a permanent per task contract are an almost 50% more likely to being recalled 
compared to those holding any other type of permanent contract. 
14 A problem when estimating single risk duration models is the potential aggregations bias. Unemployed 
typically  leave  unemployment  for  different  reasons  (competing  risks).  Restricting  the  estimated 
coefficients for the baseline hazard and the covariates to be the same for all destination states might 
therefore be a very restrictive assumption. Therefore, the econometric model for the sequence of discrete 
choice models is a multinomial logit model or competing risks model; in each spell, the unemployed can   6
 
In  a  discrete–time  competing  risks  model,  an  individual’s  unemployment  spell  is 
represented by a random variable T, which can take on positive integer values only. We 
observe  a  total  of  n  independent  individuals  (I=1,…,n)  beginning  at  some  natural 
starting point t=1. In the data used in the paper, such point is the month when the 
worker becomes unemployed for the first time during the first semester of the year 
2000. Each observation continues until time t, at which point an event occurs or the 
observation is censored. The unemployment spell can end, T=t, in any of j states: j=1 
(re-employment through a different employer from the immediately previous one) or 
j=2 (re-employment though the same employer as the immediately previous one; i.e., a 
recall  takes  place).  The  observation  is  censored  when  the  surviving  individual  is 
observed at month t but not at month t+1. It is assumed that the time of censoring is 
independent of the hazard rate for the occurrence of events, at least after controlling for 
other factors. Also, it is assumed that the set of two states at which unemployment spells 
end is absorbing and equal for each person. 
 
For  modelling  the  transition  from  unemployment  to  employment  through  recall  or 
through a different employer, we define the discrete hazard rate. For the i-th person, the 
hazard  rate into  state j (j=1,2)  in  period  t,  hij(t),  is  the  conditional  probability  of  a 
transition to state j in this period, given that individual i has been unemployed until t
15. 
 
hij(t) = Pr[Ti=ti, J=j | Ti>= ti]            [1] 
 
Assuming that the competing risks are independent, the hazard rate from unemployment 
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The conditional probability that individual i remains unemployed in period t is given by: 
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And not conditioning on the individual’s previous employment history, the survivor 
function up to period t is: 
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Then, the transition into state j in period t can be expressed in terms of the respective 
hazard rate and the survivor function as:  
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Assuming independence of all observations, the likelihood function is given by: 
                                                                                                                                               
either stay in unemployment (the reference category), be re-employed though a different employer or be 
re-employed though the same employer. 
15 According to the simple job search model (Lippman and MacCall, 1976), given a stationary reservation 
wage, the re-employment probability is the result of two probabilities: the rate at which offers arrive times 
the probability that a random offer is accepted. In our competing risks model, unemployed workers can 
either obtain a job through a different employer from the immediately previous one or be re-employed 
through recall to the previous employer.   7
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where δij equal 1 if a transition occurred at time ti and otherwise set it at zero (censored). 
Substituting [4] and [5] into [6], we can have the likelihood function in terms of the 
transition and hazard rates. We can write: 
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Given that [7] is in function of the transition rates, we just need specify the dependence 
of the latter on the explanatory variables. For the hazard rate we choose the logistic 
specification  that,  with  multiple  events,  generates  the  multinomial  logit  model 
(Maddala, 1983). It allows for the three possible states considered: employment through 
a different employer, employment through recall, and remaining unemployed (which is 
the base category). For individual i, the transition rate to state j in period t specified as a 
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where Z(t) is a vector of explanatory variables which may vary with time; β is the vector 
of parameters to be estimated; the terms α stands for the baseline hazard which captures 
the duration dependence. The specification of the baseline hazard is very important. A 
common  but  restrictive  approach  consists  of  specifying  a  parametric  form  for  the 
baseline hazard. This approach is very strong because the assumptions over the form are 
difficult to justify from an economic point of view, and provokes a misspecification 
problem. Instead, we choose a semi-parametric approach (piecewise constant hazard) by 
specifying  monthly  dummies  D(t)  which  coefficients  for  transitions  to  employment 
through recall can differ from those for transitions to employment through a different 
employer. This method presents the advantage of being flexible and assumes that the 
duration  dependence  pattern  may  vary  among  the  states.  Finally,  e  accounts  for 
unobserved  heterogeneity  characteristics  in  the  model  such  as  motivation,  ability, 
efforts, family pressure, etc.  We assume that the unobserved heterogeneity effect is 
destination state specific, time constant, and independent of the observed characteristics. 
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where cjk are indicators for making the transition to each of the possible destination 
states at time k; re-employment through a different employer from the immediately 
previous one (j=1), or re-employment though the same employer as the immediately 
previous one (j=2). In [9] a common procedure is to specify a parametric distribution for 
the  unobserved  heterogeneity  such  as  a  normal,  gamma  distribution,  etc.  However,   8
Heckman and Singer (1984) have criticised this approach, showing that parametric form 
assumptions for unobserved heterogeneity might affect the parameter estimates. For this 
reason, we assume that unobserved heterogeneity is discretely distributed with unknown 
support points. Those points can be interpreted as latent individual's types. Then, the 
likelihood  function  for  an  individual  may  be  obtained  integrating  the  following 
conditional likelihood distribution: 
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Where e are the location points (that can be interpreted as intercept for the baseline 
hazard function), p the probability associated to them, and s the number of support 
points.  In  the  following  section  we  estimate  this  likelihood  function  by  maximum 
likelihood to know how individual, industry and labour market characteristics influence 
unemployment spell durations via recall or a new job.  
 
3.1 Specification tests 
 
In table 2, we have performed tests for the assumption of ‘independence of irrelevant 
alternatives’ (IIA) through the Hausman test (Hausman and McFadden, 1984, HM) and 
Small  Hsiao  test  (Small  and  Hsiao,  1985,  SH).  Those  popular  tests  for  testing  the 
validity of IIA consist of partitioning the choice set of alternatives into subsets and 
therefore comparing the coefficients (HM) or the likelihood functions (SH) from the 
complete model and from the restricted model obtained by leaving out one or more 
alternatives.  In  both  tests,  the  null  hypothesis  of  IIA  is  accepted;  therefore,  the 
multinomial logit specification seems to be appropriate for each departure state. 
 
In addition, a Wald test and a LR test are reported in Table 2 in order to examine the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients of two categories do not differ significantly from 
each  other,  for  all  the  possible  combinations.  In  other  words,  that  some  of  the 
alternatives might be combined or aggregated into a simple category, in which case the 
specification should be binomial rather than a multinomial. In both tests the rejection of 
the null hypothesis means that it is adequate to distinguish between exits into a different 
employment  and  a  recall  job;  therefore,  the  multinomial  specification  seems  to  be 
appropriate, since none of the categories should be combined. 
 




To investigate the determinants of recall among unemployed workers, we estimate a 
discrete duration model with competing risks of exits out of unemployment.  
 
The dependent variable is the probability of becoming employed at some point of their 
unemployment spell via recall or a new job. This estimation strategy boils down to 
estimating  a  multinomial  logit  on  the  expanded  sample.  The  alternative  choice  for 
comparison is remaining unemployed. In addition to the parameters (defined over each 
month-year interval) that account for duration dependence, the explanatory variables 
used in the analysis are the following: 
 
(I)  Demographic characteristics: 
-  Gender (1 if the unemployed is male, 0 female). 
-  A set of ten age group indicators (age 35-39 is the reference group).    9
 
(II)  The individual’s labour market history: 
-  Tenure in the previous job is included through five dummy variables 
( <= 4 weeks (reference category), >4 weeks and <=20 weeks, > 20 
weeks and <= 1 year, >1 year and <= 2 years, >2 years)
16. 
-  The  qualification  level  required  for  the  previous  job  is  collected 
through  four  levels  of  the  professional  category  of  the  worker 
contribution to the Social Security
17: High qualification, medium-
high  qualification  (reference  category),  medium  qualification  and 
low qualification. See appendix Table A.1. 
-  Whether or not (reference category) the individual was hired in the 
previous job through a temporary help agency. 
-  The type of contract held in the previous job: permanent contract 
(reference category), permanent per task, temporary and other type 
of contracts
18. 
-  The number of jobs held previous to the one leading to the spell of 
unemployment under study. 
-  The type of sector where the worker was engaged at in the previous 
job:  agriculture,  construction,  services  and  industry  (reference 
category). 
-  Firm size is included through five dummy variables: <=10 workers 
(reference  category),  >10  and  <=50  workers,  >50  and  <=200 
workers, >200 and <=1000 workers and >1000 workers. 
 
(III)  The regional unemployment rate (obtained from the Spanish Labour Force 
Survey, EPA). 
(IV)  Regions of residence (seventeen dummies for the Autonomous Communities 
of Spain). Madrid is the reference category. 
(V)  Dummies for the month of entering unemployment: given that the sample that 
we use is composed of individuals who entered unemployment in the first 
semester of the year 2000, we control for this with the dummies indicating 
whether  such  months  were  January-February,  March-April,  or  May-June 
(reference category). 
 
(VI) Unemployment Compensation System: Dummy equals 1 at each month the worker 
received unemployment insurance or assistance benefits during his unemployment spell, 
and zero otherwise. We have also included in the model an interaction variable between 
contributory benefits and months of unemployment.  
 
                                                 
16 The worker’s previous employment history (i.e., job turnover) should be an important explanatory 
factor  of  the  reemployment  probability,  since  individuals  more  accustomed  to  move  from  jobs  are 
supposedly more “employable”, and thus are expected to leave unemployment earlier. 
17 We must underscore that the ten professional categories of worker contribution to Social Security in the 
database do not reveal the workers' level of qualification, but rather the required level of qualification for 
the  job.  For  instance,  an  individual  working  in  the  lowest  category,  “labourers”,  may  well  be  in 
possession of an academic degree. As in previous studies using data from the Social Security records, we 
group those eleven categories into four groups (see García Pérez and Muñoz Bullón, 2005a; 2005b), see 
appendix Table A.1. 
18 Workers under this latter type of contract enjoy a strong relationship with their previous employer 
during the lay-off: this relationship is much stronger than with other types of contracts, since individuals 
retain seniority and other employment-related benefits (for instance, they have the privilege of being 
requested first by their previous employer on their availability to re-enter their payroll). In short, the 
workers with such contracts are treated as if they had maintained their employment relationship. Thus, 
they usually do not engage in job-seeking activities because they regard themselves as employed and they 
are virtually certain to return to their jobs at the end of the layoff period.   10
 
4.2 Results  
 
Table  3  provides  the  determinants  of  exits  from  unemployment  through  recall  or 
through a new job for the entire sample. Tables 4 and 5 show results by gender. Two 
single risk estimations have been obtained based on the likelihood function (10) by the 
maximum likelihood estimator. The first column reports estimated coefficients for exits 
from  unemployment  to  a  new  job  and  the  second  column  reports  those  from 
unemployment to recall. Note that the exponential function of a parameter attached to a 
dummy measures the hazard rate for an unemployed with the dummy equal to one relative 
to a reference person.  
While men have a significantly 7.7 per cent lower probability of exiting unemployment 
into a recall job than women, the former have a 44.8 per cent higher hazard rate of 
finding a new job than the latter. This means that women enjoy shorter unemployment 
duration than men when they return to the previous employer. However, it takes women 
longer when they enter a new job. As regards age, the 35-39 age interval marks the 
difference: the youngest workers are more likely to find a new job while the eldest 
workers are more likely to being recalled. 
 
Our dataset does not provide variables related to the individual’s educational attainment 
and occupation. However, we know the required level of qualification for the job (see 
appendix  Table  A.1).  Estimations  results  show  that  if  an  involuntary  interruption 
occurs,  those  workers  holding  higher  qualification  levels  are  more  likely  to  being 
recalled  by  their  previous  employer  and  lower  qualified  workers  suffer  the  greatest 
difficulties in finding a new job. 
 
There are several variables that provide interesting insights into the way workers exit 
from unemployment in Spain: whether or not the individual has been employed through 
a Temporary Help Agency (THA), firm size, sector, type of contract and tenure in the 
previous job. We appreciate that having worked via a THA enhances 50.4 per cent the 
probability of finding a new job, while the recall hazard is not affected by agency work. 
We also obtain that the probability of recall increases monotonically with firm size, if 
the individual has held a permanent per task contract in the former job, if he has worked 
in the industry sector, and when tenure in that former job ranged —in particular— from 
20 weeks to one year (in addition, from 4 weeks to two years). However, the higher the 
relative job stability experienced by workers in the previous job, the higher the exit rate 
from unemployment into a different employer is; this effect is higher for workers in the 
agriculture sector, and lower for workers with a previous permanent per task contract. 
 
The effect of unemployment compensation has the expected effects for both the recall 
and  the  “ordinary”  unemployed  (i.e.,  unemployed  who  entered  a  new  job):  Non-
claimants exit from unemployment faster than claimants do. Results also suggest that 
the  probability  of  leaving  unemployment  does  not  appear  significantly  different 
according to the route taken back to work. While the disincentive effect of contributory 
and assistance benefits is similar in magnitude for unemployed who entered into a new 
job, the impact of benefits on the recall outcome differ in magnitude for those who were 
recalled.  The  probability  of  exiting  from  unemployment  through  recall  is  strongly 
negatively influenced by assistance benefits (which is typically received by workers 
with low worker-firm attachment), but it is relatively weakly influenced by holding 
contributory benefits (which is typically received by workers with high worker-firm 
attachment). The non-existence of an estimated positive recall effect for the latter does 
not support the implicit contract hypothesis and suggests that search explanations may 
be more appropriate.     11
 
Regarding  the  effect  of  regional  labour  market  characteristics  on  unemployment 
duration, estimations also include dummies to take account of the existence of regional 
differences  (not  reported)  and  a  continuous  variable  on  the  regional  (quarterly) 
unemployment  rate  (as  a  time  varying  covariate).  Compared  to  Madrid  (regional 
reference  category),  workers  in  almost  every  other  region  are  more  likely  to  being 
recalled (except for Navarra, La Rioja, Balearic Islands and Aragon, whose effect is 
null, and negative in Catalonian). This effect is especially stronger in regions such as 
Andalucia and Extremadura (i.e. regions with unemployment rates above the national 
average).  The  opposite  pattern  of  exiting  from  unemployment  into  a  new  job  is 
observed in the same regions. Concerning the quarterly regional unemployment rate as a 
measure of demand side factors, we find that it is negatively correlated with the hazard 
rate from unemployment to a job (via recall or a new job). 
 
Concerning  unobserved  heterogeneity,  we  notice  that  two  support  points  are  highly 
significant. The estimated support points are -4.908 and -3.021 with probability masses 
0.095 and 0.904, respectively. This means that exit rates from unemployment to a new or 
a recall job are affected not only by measured individual and job characteristics of the 
unemployed, but also by their unobserved characteristics
19.  
 
In relation to the pattern of duration dependence (the way the hazard rate depends on 
process time), Figure 1 shows the predicted hazard rate (after controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity) at mean of covariates for the entire sample. As can be observed, the 
hazard rate from unemployment into re-employment through recall keeps below the rate 
from unemployment into new job finding. The difference between both predicted hazard 
rates widens as unemployment duration lengthens. Moreover, it can be observed how in 
a competing risks framework the recall hazard rate steadily exhibits positive duration 
dependence  during  the  first  months  (up  to  the  second  one)  and  negative  duration 
dependence  thereafter,  while  the  predicted  hazard  for  new  jobs  presents  positive 
duration dependence (similar to a Weibull distribution). 
 
In essence, this picture lets us confirm different predictions about contract and search 
temporary layoff models
20. At short unemployment durations (up to the third month), 
predictions are rather similar for both types of exits; however, for long unemployment 
durations, predictions differ because recall workers do no search while they are only 
waiting (contract models), and those who enter into a new job (search models) do a lot 
of search and little waiting. In other words, the longer someone is unemployed, the less 
is the probability of being recalled and the more likely it is to enter into a new job. 
 
Two  explanations  may  be  underlying  this  result.  On  the  one  hand,  firms  cannot 
immediately determine whether downturns are transitory or permanent: the longer a low 
demand state lasts, the more likely it will become a “permanent” low demand state. As a 
consequence,  the  longer  a  worker  remains  on  layoff,  the  lower  his  perceived 
instantaneous recall probability. This will induce a declining reservation wage. Thus, 
                                                 
19 When comparing estimations with and without (not reported) unobserved heterogeneity, the estimated 
coefficients  and  the  value  of  the  log-likelihood  are  influenced  by  the  inclusion  of  the  unobserved 
heterogeneity. On the one hand, the unobserved heterogeneity component increases the log-likelihood 
values in the estimations, therefore improving the fits of the models. On the other hand, there are some 
differences in the coefficients for some variables (for example in variables such as firm size, type of 
sector, tenure in previous job and in some age groups) that increase the magnitude (in absolute value) of 
the parameters of the exit rates from unemployment to recall or a new job. Moreover, the likelihood ratio 
test of a model with unobserved heterogeneity against that without also supports the same conclusion that 
unobserved heterogeneity is significant.  
20 A description of contract and search theories can be found in Mavroramas and Orme (2004).   12
revised expectations of the recall probability result in increased search activity, which 
increases the new job hazard rate. On the other hand, the risk of losing employees on 
temporary layoff increases with unemployment duration, which would tend to yield 
earlier recall by the employer. This result is coherent with the ones found by  Katz 
(1986) and Katz and Meyer (1990): unemployment duration hazards —which decline 
when treating the re-employment probability as a single risk— will often decline only 
for recalls when using competing risks model, while the hazard rate is increasing for 
new jobs. 
 
Tables 4 and 5 show some differences in the determinants of exits from unemployment 
between men and women, respectively. As regards age, women follow a pattern similar 
to the entire sample; i.e., the youngest women are more likely to find a new job, while 
the eldest are more likely to being recalled. The youngest men also tend to find a new 
job  more  easily  than  the  reference  category.  However,  the  eldest  men  are  not 
significantly more likely to being recalled. 
 
Both men and women experiment a positive impact on the likelihood of being recalled 
from the fact of holding a high qualification level, but only the latter suffer a negative 
impact on finding a new job from holding a low qualification level. 
 
Estimated results by gender as regards the remainder explanatory variables (type of 
contract,  tenure  in  the  previous  job,  firm  size,  job  through  a  THA,  unemployment 
benefit status and number of previous jobs) do not basically differ from those obtained 
for the entire sample. 
 
Finally, Figure 2 shows the pattern of duration dependence by gender (after controlling 
for unobserved heterogeneity) at mean of covariates. As previously discussed for the 
entire sample, the hazard rate from unemployment into a new job keeps over the hazard 
rate from unemployment through recall. Furthermore, the recall hazard rate steadily 
exhibits  positive  duration  dependence  during the  first  months  and  negative  duration 
dependence  thereafter  (higher  in  females),  while  the  empirical  hazard  for  new  jobs 




This paper examines transitions out of unemployment in Spain towards two distinct 
types of employment: recall to the same employer or reemployment in a new job. This 
issue has so far never been studied in Spain. We have used data from Social Security 
records combined with data produced by the Spanish Employment Office where we 
have information about worker and job characteristics before and after unemployment, 
in addition to information about the duration of the unemployment. To study transitions 
out of unemployment, we estimate a discrete time competing risks duration model of 
exits to a recall or new job where duration dependence is accounted for through the use 
of  a  semi-parametric  piecewise  constant  hazard  estimation.  We  also  control  for 
unobserved and observed heterogeneity. 
 
The effects of individuals characteristics suggest that the hazard of being recalled to the 
same employer is more likely for women, for older individuals (above 40 years-old) and 
for  higher  qualified  workers  (with,  presumably,  larger  specific  human  capital). 
Concerning  job  characteristics,  the  fact  of  holding  a  previous  permanent  per  task 
contract or of experiencing previous job tenure ranging between 20 weeks and 1 year 
enhances the recall hazard. At the same time, temporary layoffs generated in an implicit 
contract framework are relatively more prevalent in the industry sector and in the largest 
firms,  since  their  unemployed  workers  are  more  likely  to  being  recalled.  On  the   13
contrary, working through a temporary help agency does not affect the recall hazard 
rate. 
 
In contrast with these effects, we obtain that men, young workers (above 35 years-old) 
and those working via a temporary help agency enjoy a higher likelihood of exiting 
from  unemployment  into  a  new  job.  We  also  find  a  positive  influence  of  previous 
employment experiences on future new jobs: the longer the job stability experienced by 
workers  in  previous  employment  engagements,  the  higher  the  exit  rate  from 
unemployment into a new job. 
 
Another  important  finding  is  that  not  only  do  individuals  and  job  characteristics 
influence the hazard rates differently, but also that the duration dependence is different.  
Different processes are governing the recall and new-job hazards, since the recall hazard 
rate presents positive duration dependence until the second month and negative duration 
thereafter  (larger  for  females),  while  the  new-job  hazard  exhibits  positive  duration 
dependence (larger for males). 
 
As regards the effect of contributory and assistance benefits, non- claimants exit from 
unemployment faster than claimants do. Nevertheless, while the disincentive effect of 
the two types of benefits is similar in magnitude for the unemployed who entered into a 
new job, the negative effect for recall workers is stronger for those holding assistance 
benefits rather than contributory benefits.  
 
The  empirical  findings  for  Spain  in  this  paper  establish  that  recall  to  the  former 
employer and, therefore, temporary job separations constitute an important feature of 
Spanish labour market. Firm specific human capital, as well as efficient risk sharing 
and,  last  but  not  least,  possibly  collusive  behaviour  for  taking  advantage  of  the 
unemployment compensation system may make implicit contracts of this sort attractive 
for both workers and firms when facing downturns in product demand. These issues 
remain open for further research. 
 





Table A.1 Occupation category groups 
 




1.  Engineers and bachelors. 
2.  Technical  engineers,  experts  and 
qualified assistants. 
3.  Administrative  chiefs  and  of 
workshop. 
Upper-Intermediate Occupation  4.  Not qualified assistants. 
5.  Administrative officials. 
6.  Secondary (Minor). 
Lower-Intermediate Occupation  7.  Administrative assistants. 
8.  Officials of the first and the second.  
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Table A.2 Loss of observations from initial data set 
 
Initial sample size:  79,267 
Observations deleted due to:   
- Enter into unemployment due to reasons different from involuntary ones  21,702 
-  Missing variables used in the empirical analysis: 
-  Sex 
-  Sector of activity 
-  Qualification 
-  Age 
-  Reason for benefits 








- Enjoy unemployment benefit different from contributive or assistance ones  19 
- Unemployment duration <= 30 days  34,464 
Final sample size used in the empirical analysis:  23,035 
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Table 1. Main descriptive statistics for first unemployment spell in 2000 
 







Gender  =1 if male  0.517  0.436  0.562 
Age  Age in years when entering unemployment       
16-19  =1 if aged 16 to 19  0.071  0.043  0.087 
20-24  =1 if aged 20 to 24  0.218  0.166  0.246 
25-29  =1 if aged 25 to 29  0.206  0.176  0.223 
30-34  =1 if aged 30 to 34  0.152  0.158  0.149 
35-39  =1 if aged 35 to 39  0.122  0.147  0.109 
40-44  =1 if aged 40 to 44  0.092  0.122  0.076 
45-49  =1 if aged 45 to 49  0.064  0.086  0.052 
50-54  =1 if aged 50 to 54  0.046  0.061  0.037 
55-59  =1 if aged 55 to 59  0.023  0.032  0.019 
59-62  =1 if aged more than 59 years old  0.005  0.009  0.003 
Qualification level         
High  =1 if Social Security bracket for 
contribution in previous job is 1, 2 or 3.  0.083  0.099  0.073 
Upper-intermediate  =1 if Social Security bracket for 
contribution in previous job is 4, 5 or 6  0.111  0.097  0.119 
Lower-intermediate  =1 if Social Security bracket for 
contribution in previous job is 7 or 8  0.289  0.244  0.314 
Low  =1 if Social Security bracket for 
contribution in previous job is 9 or 10.  0.517  0.559  0.494 
Type of contract  Type of contract in previous job       
Permanent  =1 if permanent contract  0.069  0.029  0.091 
Permanent per task  =1 if permanent per task contract  0.036  0.084  0.012 
Temporary  =1 if temporary contract   0.849  0.825  0.863 
Other contract type  =1 if other contract type   0.044  0.062  0.034 
         
Temporary  help 
agency 
=1 if previously employed through a THA 
0.052  0.036  0.061 
Firm size         
<= 10 employees  =1 if number of employees up to 10  0.343  0.290  0.372 
>10 and <=50  =1 if number of employees above 10 and 
up to 50  0.294  0.297  0.293 
>50 & <=200  =1 if number of employees above 50 and 
up to 200  0.186  0.200  0.179 
>200 & <=1000  =1 if number of employees above 200 and 
up to 1000  0.120  0.135  0.111 
>1000  =1 if number of employees above 1000  0.057  0.077  0.045 
Tenure  in  previous 
job 






<=4  =1 if up to 4 weeks  0.255  0.298  0.232 
>4 and <=20  =1 if above 4 weeks and up to 20 weeks  0.308  0.273  0.327 
>20 and <=1 year  =1 if above 20 weeks and up to 1 year  0.311  0.356  0.286 
>1 and <= 2 years  =1 if above 1 year and up to 2 years  0.076  0.051  0.090 
> 2 years  =1 if above 2 years  0.049  0.021  0.064 
Worked in a 
Temporary Help 
Agency 
=1 if worked in a THA in previous job 




     
Contributory benefit  Proportion collecting contributory benefits  
at the beginning of spell (=1 for each 
month worker collects benefits)  0.2230  0.1718  0.2515 
Assistance benefit  Proportion collecting assistance benefits at 
the beginning of spell (=1 for each month 
worker collects benefits)  0.0538  0.0524  0.0546 
Without benefit  Proportion without benefits at the  0.7232  0.7759  0.6939   20
beginning of spell (=1 for each month 
worker collects no benefits) 
Number of previous 
jobs 
















>4 and <=20  =1 if Above 4 weeks and up to 20 weeks  0.577  0.652  0.535 
>20 and <=1 year  =1 if Above 20 weeks and up to 1 year  0.281  0.251  0.298 
>1 year  =1 if Above 1 year  0.142  0.097  0.167 
Sample size    23,035  8,227  14,808   21 
Table 2. Specification tests. 
Test for IIA 
Ho: Odds(Outcome-J vs Outcome-K) are 
independent of other alternatives. 
 
c c c c
2(P>c c c c
2) 
Hausman 
Omitted: Different employment. 






Omitted: Different employment 





Wald and LR test for combining outcomes 
Ho: All coefficients except intercepts associated 
with given pair of outcomes are 0 (i.e., categories 
can be collapsed). 
 
Wald test 
Combining different employment and recall job. 
Combining diff. employment and unemployment. 
Combining recall job and unemployment. 
 
LR test 
Combining different employment and recall job. 
Combining diff. employment and unemployment. 










4371.359(0.00)   22
Table 3. Estimates and standard error of transitions from unemployment to employment 
through recall or to employment through a different employer after controlling 
observed and unobserved heterogeneity (with two support points). 
  ENTIRE SAMPLE   
  Dif. Emp  Recall 
  Coef,  S.E.  Sign.  Coef,  S.E.  Sign. 
Gender (male=1)  0.370  0.024  ***  -0.080  0.028  *** 
Age at unemployment spell:             
Age 16-19  0.352  0.051  ***  -0.545  0.068  *** 
Age 20-24  0.422  0.040  ***  -0.268  0.047  *** 
Age 25-29  0.271  0.039  ***  -0.212  0.046  *** 
Age 30-34  0.138  0.043  ***  -0.109  0.047  *** 
Age 35-39   -  -  -  -  -  - 
Age 40-44  -0.060  0.049    0.137  0.051  *** 
Age 45-49  -0.106  0.055  **  0.139  0.056  *** 
Age 50-54  -0.098  0.062    0.162  0.063  *** 
Age 55-59  -0.062  0.080    0.151  0.081   
Age 59-62  -0.453  0.178  ***  0.401  0.155  *** 
Qualification level:             
Qual. High  -0.010  0.051    0.212  0.059  *** 
Qual. Med.-High  -  -    -  -   
Qual. Medium-Low  0.086  0.037  ***  0.060  0.048   
Qual. Low  -0.165  0.037  ***  -0.043  0.045   
Type of contract:             
Permanent contract  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Permanent per task   -0.306  0.094  ***  1.692  0.086  *** 
Temporary  0.187  0.045  ***  0.731  0.070  *** 
Other type  0.050  0.070    0.904  0.088  *** 
Firm size:             
<=10 employees  -  -  -  -  -  - 
> 10 and <=50 employees  0.054  0.027  **  0.192  0.033  *** 
>50 and <=200 employees  0.151  0.032  ***  0.393  0.039  *** 
>200 and <= 1000 employees  0.061  0.040    0.517  0.046  *** 
>1000 employees  -0.025  0.058    0.804  0.060  *** 
Tenure in previous job:             
<= 4 weeks  -  -  -  -  -  - 
>4 weeks and <=20 weeks  0.473  0.033  ***  0.081  0.037  ** 
> 20 weeks and <= 1 year  0.602  0.039  ***  0.552  0.041  *** 
> 1 year and <= 2 years  0.611  0.050  ***  0.134  0.066  ** 
> 2 years  0.593  0.059  ***  -0.245  0.095  *** 
Worked in a Temporary Help Agency   0.408  0.055  ***  -0.061  0.072   
Unemployment benefit status:             
Receives no benefits  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Contributory benefits (tvc)  -0.400  0.041  ***  -0.566  0.058  *** 
Assistance benefits (tvc)  -0.454  0.055  ***  -0.873  0.070  *** 
Month * Contributory benefits  -0.016  0.008  *  -0.032  0.015  *** 
Number of previous jobs  0.102  0.007  ***  0.125  0.007  *** 
Regional Unemployment rate (tvc)  -0.023  0.009  ***  -0.062  0.010  *** 
Sector of activity             
Industry  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Agriculture  0.510  0.153  ***  -0.004  0.186   
Construction  0.056  0.041    -0.341  0.051  *** 
Services  0.009  0.034    -0.249  0.040  *** 
Mass points and probability   
e1 (s.e.)  -4.908(0.243)*** 
e2 (s.e.)  -3.020(0.125)*** 
Pr(e1)  0.096   23
Pr(e2)  0.904 
No. Observations  125,044 
No. of individuals  23,035 
Log-likelihood  -68,259 
Note:  Regression  includes  controls  for  17  regions,  unemployment  duration  (in  months)  dummies 
variables (baseline) and month of entering unemployment. "tvc" means time varying covariate. 
*** Indicates significance at 1 per cent; ** indicates significance at 5 per cent.   24
Table 4. Men's transitions from unemployment to employment through recall or to different 
employer with unobserved heterogeneity (two support points). 
  MEN 
  Dif. Emp  Recall 
  Coef,  S.E.  Sign.  Coef,  S.E.  Sign. 
Age at unemployment. spell:             
Age 16-19  0.182  0.067  ***  -0.708  0.097  *** 
Age 20-24  0.332  0.056  ***  -0.212  0.070  *** 
Age 25-29  0.197  0.055  ***  -0.206  0.069  *** 
Age 30-34  0.172  0.058  ***  -0.108  0.071   
Age 35-39   -  -  -  -  -  - 
Age 40-44  -0.076  0.065    0.034  0.076   
Age 45-49  -0.175  0.071  **  0.024  0.083   
Age 50-54  -0.092  0.080    0.084  0.094   
Age 55-59  0.009  0.098    0.004  0.119   
Age 59-62  -0.382  0.198  **  0.275  0.210   
Qualification level:             
Qual. High  -0.101  0.075    0.235  0.094  *** 
Qual. Med.-High  -  -    -  -   
Qual. Medium-Low  0.111  0.057  **  0.082  0.076   
Qual. Low  -0.080  0.055    -0.108  0.073   
Type of contract:             
Permanent contract  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Permanent per task   -0.428  0.165  ***  1.997  0.145  *** 
Temporary  0.141  0.063  **  0.832  0.104  *** 
Other type  0.041  0.104    0.750  0.144  *** 
Firm size:             
<=10 employees  -  -  -  -  -  - 
> 10 and <=50 employees  0.095  0.036  ***  0.145  0.047  *** 
>50 and <=200 employees  0.192  0.044  ***  0.228  0.059  *** 
>200 and <= 1000 employees  0.038  0.056    0.392  0.070  *** 
>1000 employees  -0.043  0.089    0.719  0.101  *** 
Tenure in previous job:             
<= 4 weeks  -  -  -  -  -  - 
>4 weeks and <=20 weeks  0.501  0.043  ***  0.023  0.054   
> 20 weeks and <= 1 year  0.640  0.049  ***  0.470  0.058  *** 
> 1 year and <= 2 years  0.661  0.066  ***  0.253  0.090  *** 
> 2 years  0.578  0.079  ***  -0.066  0.124   
Worked in a Temporary Help Agency   0.435  0.079  ***  0.014  0.107   
Unemployment benefit status:             
Receives no benefits  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Contributory benefits (tvc)  -0.418  0.054  ***  -0.682  0.084  *** 
Assistance benefits (tvc)  -0.425  0.077  ***  -0.989  0.121  *** 
Month * Contributory benefits  -0.023  0.012  **  -0.034  0.021   
Number of previous jobs  0.083  0.009  ***  0.099  0.010  *** 
Regional Unemployment rate (tvc)  0.027  0.012  ***  -0.080  0.014  *** 
Sector of activity             
Industry  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Agriculture  0.348  0.185  *  0.049  0.257   
Construction  0.061  0.049    -0.276  0.066  *** 
Services  -0.082  0.046  *  -0.246  0.059  *** 
Mass points and probability   
e1 (s.e.)  -4.575(0.316)*** 
e2 (s.e.)  -2.668(0.192)*** 
Pr(e1)  0.107 
Pr(e2)  0.893 
No. Observations  62,136   25
Log-likelihood  -34,961.853 
Note: See note Table 3.   26
Table5. Women's transitions from unemployment to employment through recall or to 
different employer with unobserved heterogeneity (two support points). 
  WOMEN 
  Dif. Emp  Recall 
  Coef,  S.E.  Sign.  Coef,  S.E.  Sign. 
Age at unemployment. spell:             
Age 16-19  0.568  0.084  ***  -0.368  0.100  *** 
Age 20-24  0.527  0.061  ***  -0.287  0.065  *** 
Age 25-29  0.366  0.061  ***  -0.207  0.064  *** 
Age 30-34  0.124  0.067  *  -0.108  0.066  * 
Age 35-39   -  -  -  -  -  - 
Age 40-44  -0.036  0.081    0.218  0.072  *** 
Age 45-49  0.003  0.091    0.211  0.081  *** 
Age 50-54  -0.113  0.110    0.224  0.091  *** 
Age 55-59  -0.263  0.156  *  0.270  0.119  ** 
Age 59-62  -0.831  0.462  *  0.505  0.249  ** 
Qualification level:             
Qual. High  0.106  0.073  *  0.206  0.079  *** 
Qual. Med.-High  -  -    -  -   
Qual. Medium-Low  0.038  0.054  *  -0.012  0.065  * 
Qual. Low  -0.220  0.054  ***  -0.046  0.060  * 
Type of contract:             
Permanent contract  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Permanent per task   -0.196  0.124    1.463  0.114  *** 
Temporary  0.265  0.070  ***  0.634  0.095  *** 
Other type  0.065  0.104  *  0.877  0.117  *** 
Firm size:             
<=10 employees  -  -  -  -  -  - 
> 10 and <=50 employees  0.006  0.044    0.229  0.050  *** 
>50 and <=200 employees  0.103  0.049  **  0.512  0.054  *** 
>200 and <= 1000 employees  0.081  0.058    0.625  0.062  *** 
>1000 employees  -0.035  0.078    0.882  0.078  *** 
Tenure in previous job:             
<= 4 weeks  -  -  -  -  -  - 
>4 weeks and <=20 weeks  0.423  0.048  ***  0.103  0.052  ** 
> 20 weeks and <= 1 year  0.571  0.055  ***  0.603  0.057  *** 
> 1 year and <= 2 years  0.564  0.078  ***  -0.014  0.100   
> 2 years  0.626  0.098  ***  -0.468  0.154  *** 
Worked in a Temporary Help Agency   0.445  0.081  ***  -0.065  0.102   
Unemployment benefit status:             
Receives no benefits  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Contributory benefits (tvc)  -0.395  0.065  ***  -0.475  0.081  *** 
Assistance benefits (tvc)  -0.509  0.081  ***  -0.838  0.088  *** 
Month * Contributory benefits  -0.021  0.012  *  -0.042  0.021  ** 
Number of previous jobs  0.145  0.012  ***  0.173  0.012  *** 
Regional Unemployment rate (tvc)  0.030  0.013  **  -0.049  0.014  *** 
Sector of activity             
Industry  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Agriculture  0.844  0.279  ***  -0.174  0.281   
Construction  -0.453  0.105  ***  -0.677  0.102  *** 
Services  0.118  0.057  **  -0.313  0.058  *** 
Mass points and probability   
e1 (s.e.)  -4.773(0.209)*** 
e2 (s.e.)  -2.918(0.173)*** 
Pr(e1)  0.152 
Pr(e2)  0.848 
No. Observations  62,136   27
Log-likelihood  -33,047.64 
Note: See note Table 3.   28
Figure 1. The shape of the predicted hazard rate from unemployment into recall or 
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Figure 2. The shape of the predicted hazard rate from unemployment into recall or 
different employer (after controlling unobserved heterogeneity) at the mean of 
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